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 “Let’s Wait and see!” 
the ReaL OptiOn tO sWitch as a neW eLement Of 
custOmeR VaLue**
abstRact
We suggest that a customer’s option to switch suppliers, and to wait and see before 
switching, adds to customer value in uncertain markets, and affects the customer’s 
switching behavior. We use a real options model to examine the value of this option and 
conduct sensitivity analyses based on data collected from the German public health 
insurance market to support our argument. We elaborate on the customer value con-
struct and show how it contributes to customers’ behavioral loyalty.  We also provide 
guidelines for managers of in-suppliers and out-suppliers on how to use the value of 
customers’ option to switch, e.g., for pricing decisions and management of customer 
churn.
Jel Classification:  m31.
Keywords:  Customer loyalty; Customer relationships; Customer Value; real options; 
switching Behavior; uncertainty.
1 intROductiOn
In the early 1990s, marketing researchers started shifting their focus from the precipi-
tation of exchange transactions to the facilitation of buyer-seller relationships. Together 
with the conceptual and empirical progress in relationship marketing (Sheth and Par-
vatiyar (1995)) and the growing empirical evidence of a loyal customer base’s merits 
(Reichheld and Sasser (1990)), the concept of customer loyalty has undergone rigorous 
scientific investigation. Marketing researchers have now identified various drivers of 
customer loyalty, such as customer satisfaction (Fornell, (1992); Ganesan (1994); Gar-
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barino and Johnson (1999)), customer trust (Sirdeshmukh, Singh, and Sabol (2002)), 
switching costs (Morgan and Hunt (1994); Wathne, Biong, and Heide (2001)), service 
quality (Brady and Robertson (2001); Zeithaml, Berry, and Parasuraman (1996)), and 
lower prices (Cannon and Homburg (2001)). In particular, the customer value con-
struct plays a pivotal role in explaining the creation of loyalty in relationships (Liu, 
Leach, and Bernhardt (2005); Nijssen, Singh, Sirdeshmukh, and Holzmüller (2003); 
Ulaga (2001)) and has demonstrated to mediate the effects of customer satisfaction and 
customer trust (Sirdeshmukh, Singh, and Sabol (2002)). In accordance with the social 
exchange theory, Grisaffe and Kumar (1998) argue that as long as the customer’s per-
ceived value of the current supplier is higher than that of any other supplier, the cus-
tomer will stay in a relationship and remain loyal.
Although the marketing literature has enlightened the role of value for customer 
switching behavior, several shortcomings remain. First, research on the nature of 
customer value has been predominantly empirical/descriptive in nature (cf. Wood-
all (2003); Ulaga and Eggert, (2006)); it has not been developed from more rigorous 
mathematical theory. Second, the literature on customer value and customer switch-
ing behavior leaves some blank spots. For instance, it fails to explain the frequently 
observed phenomenon that customers tend to stay in unattractive or unsatisfactory re-
lationships with one supplier, although they could have other, more valuable relation-
ships with other suppliers within the product category. When, for instance, compar-
ing the Belgian, Israeli, German, Dutch, and Swiss social health insurance markets, in 
their 2004 study Laske-Aldershof et al. found that in Germany, consumers were only 
moderately inclined to switch even though they could generate higher value by switch-
ing health insurance providers. Similarly, Lambrecht, Seim, and Skiera (2007) find a 
strong preference among customers of high-speed Internet connections to remain with 
their current provider. A look at the volatile electricity market shows that although “… 
companies exhibit deficits with regard to corporate reputation and customer satisfac-
tion” (Walsh, Dinnie, and Wiedmann (2006)) very few households switch suppliers 
(Kranhold (1997); Bundesnetzagentur (2010)). These empirical findings suggest that 
customer loyalty has antecedents, probably overlooked value components, other than 
those that have traditionally been discussed in the marketing literature. Third, cur-
rent models of customer switching behavior are largely static in nature. Static models 
ignore customers’ responses to uncertainty in dynamic markets and cannot represent 
intertemporal choice. In particular, static models are unable to account for the finding 
that customers stay in relationships when the benefits of switching outweigh the costs 
(Schlesinger and Schulenburg (1993)). Finally, research has ignored flexibility as a po-
tential component of customer value. Research disregards the fact that customers can 
defer their decisions on whether to stay or to switch suppliers. By doing so, customers 
can learn more about the current and other potential supplier offerings, especially when 
market prices are uncertain. 
In this paper we contribute to filling these gaps in the marketing literature. We fol-
low Schlesinger and Schulenburg’s (1993) suggestion of using “… some type of ‘option 
1 Throughout the paper, we use customer loyalty as an antonym for customer switching behavior.
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value’ for delaying a switch” by conceptualizing the option to switch as a new compo-
nent of the customer value construct. This new component reflects the inherent uncer-
tainty in customer value and the customer’s flexibility in reacting to it. Hence, we add 
a dynamic perspective to the customer value construct. 
Moreover, to examine this option we use rigorous mathematical modeling from capital 
market theory. Using an empirical example from the German health insurance market, 
we illustrate a practical approach to determine the option value and we demonstrate 
that the option value can be substantial. In this same vein, we also examine the relative 
influence of several key drivers on the option value.
In addition to these theoretical contributions, we also offer insights for marketing 
management. Taking into account customers’ option to switch helps managers better 
explain and predict customer value, loyalty, and ultimately, their switching behavior 
when faced with uncertainty. We demonstrate that managers can exploit customers’ 
appreciation of the value of flexibility and how customers can determine this value. 
Thus, our approach also lays the foundation for a value-based segmentation of custom-
ers, because customers with different planning horizons and perceptions of uncertainty 
distinguish different values of the option to switch, and therefore differ in their likeli-
hood to exercise the switching option. Since we identify uncertainty as a pivotal driver 
of customer value, managing uncertainty, e.g., by means of price changes or market-
ing communication, should become an integral part of the marketing mix. In contrast 
to the traditional, predominantly negative view of uncertainty in marketing manage-
ment, we propose that uncertainty should not, per se, be regarded as negative, but as 
a potentially valuable tool for incumbent providers to retain customers or to impose 
higher prices.  We intend our paper to serve as a basis for more deliberate and precise 
managerial decision-making, particularly for pricing decisions and the management of 
customer churn.
To provide a foundation for customer switching behavior driven by the option to 
switch we develop three propositions. Based on these propositions, we offer suggestions 
to managers who either strive to generate customer loyalty or who want to make pricing 
decisions that are based on their assessments of the whole value delivered to customers.
The paper proceeds as follows.  In Section 2 we provide a brief literature review of the 
customer value construct and how it impacts customer switching behavior. In Section 3 
we introduce the real options framework to model uncertainty in the customer’s switch-
ing calculations. Thus, we demonstrate the effect of this option by using a switching 
model. This model draws from Margrabe’s (1978) initial model to exchange one risky 
asset for another, in which we use the suppliers’ offerings as the risky assets. In Section 4 
we apply the model to the German health insurance market and illustrate the impact of 
the option to switch suppliers on the customer value. A sensitivity analysis shows how 
the different option parameters can influence the option value. Section 5 concludes 
with the theoretical and managerial implications and a discussion of the study’s limita-
tions and possible extensions.
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2  LiteRatuRe ReVieW 
2.1	 Customer	Value	
The relationship marketing literature is increasingly focused on the customer value 
construct. In business and services marketing, the customer value construct has 
emerged as a major key determinant of customer relationships (Agustín and Singh 
(2005); Nijssen, Singh, Sirdeshmukh, and Holzmüller (2003); Ulaga, (2003)). 
Researchers such as Anderson and Narus (2004), Kumar and Grisaffe (2004), Ravald 
and Grönroos (1996), Ulaga and Eggert (2006), Woodruff (1997), and Zeithaml (1988) 
define customer value as the outcome of an evaluation in which the customer weighs a 
relationship’s perceived benefits against the sacrifices. Usually, scholars view customer 
value as a multidimensional construct. Chiu, Hsieh, Li, and Lee (2005) differentiate 
between utilitarian and hedonic value in the customer value construct. In contrast to 
other researchers, they focus solely on the customer value’s benefit dimension. Woodall 
(2003) considers a “rational value for the customer” as a construct of an essentially 
utilitarian nature. As a starting point, customers use a price benchmark, which could 
be a price band, a maximum price, and/or a market price. By taking the perceived 
benefits as well as the price benchmark into account, customers form an idea of a “fair” 
price. 
After an extensive literature review, Woodall (2003) also provides an overview of 
the components of benefits and sacrifices. Not only do benefits consist of product 
attributes, which represent product and service quality, core product and added service 
features, and customization, but they also comprise product outcomes, which represent 
strategic, personal, social, practical, and financial benefits. Sacrifices can be monetary 
or nonmonetary. Monetary sacrifices inevitably incur costs (i.e., price, and also search, 
acquisition, opportunity distribution, learning, use, maintenance, and disposal costs), 
but nonmonetary sacrifices include not only relationship and psychological costs, but 
also costs in time and effort. 
Ulaga (2001) finds that the customer value construct is an important antecedent of 
customer loyalty in relationships. Drawing on social exchange theory, Nijssen, Singh, 
Sirdeshmukh, and Holzmüller (2003) develop the satisfaction-trust-value-loyalty model, 
in which value serves as the ultimate explanatory variable of loyalty. On the whole, 
empirical evidence shows that customer-perceived value has a significant influence 
on customer loyalty (see, e.g., Agustín and Singh, (2005); Lam, Shankar, Erramilli, 
and Murthy, (2004)). Chiu, Hsieh, Li, and Lee (2005) find that the utilitarian value 
component has a higher impact on loyalty than does the hedonic. Spiteri and Dion 
(2004) find that in business markets, customer value correlates significantly with end-
user loyalty. 
2  We use the term customer value in the sense of value for the customer throughout this manuscript (cf. Sinha 
and DeSarbo (1998); Ulaga and Eggert (2006); Woodruff (1997); Zeithaml (1988)). It should not be confused 
with customer value as a short form of customer lifetime value, which is the value of the customer from the sell-
er’s perspective (cf. Palmatier (2008)). 
J. Henseler/e. roemer
  
 sbr 65  april 2013  112-136116
2.2	switChing	options
In the real options literature, researchers have studied switching options as a combina-
tion of options to sell a real asset (put option) and to buy a real asset (call option). Based 
on entry-exit models (Brennan and Schwartz (1985); Dixit (1989)) academics have de-
veloped varous switching models. Switching options investigate the question of when it 
is optimal to switch production inputs (Kulatilaka (1993)) or outputs (Kulatilaka and 
Trigeorgis (1994)), markets (Dasu and Li (1997)), or relationship partners (Kamrad and 
Siddique (2004)).
Complementing the customer value and customer loyalty literature, marketing scholars 
focus on customer switching behavior. For example, academics identify different anteced-
ents of customer switching behavior in empirical studies (e.g., Heide and Weiss (1995) 
for organizational customers in uncertain high-technology markets or Keaveney (1995) 
for customers in services industries). In addition, a major portion of marketing literature 
investigates switching costs (Jackson (1985); Heide and John (1988); Heide and John 
(1990); Weiss and Anderson (1992); Morgan and Hunt (1994); Heide and Weiss (1995); 
Wathne, Biong, and Heide (2001)). These costs can be split up into costs of exit and 
entry. To exit a current relationship, a partner may have to incur transaction costs (Stew-
art (1998)), contractual costs (Weiss and Anderson (1992)), costs of negative feedback 
(Weiss and Anderson (1992)), and the loss of specific assets (Wathne, Biong, and Heide 
(2001)). To enter into a new relationship, the buyer may incur transaction costs such as 
search and evaluation costs (Stewart (1998); Wathne, Biong, and Heide (2001)). In ad-
dition, the buyer may have to dedicate set-up investments to the new partnership. These 
investments might include investments in lasting physical assets, human assets, and/or 
business procedures (Jackson (1985); also Harrigan (1980)). Switching costs make cus-
tomers stay in relationships and prevent them from switching to outside suppliers. At the 
same time they reduce the value of the option to switch suppliers.
In the literature on the customer value construct, the value of the option to switch has 
received scant attention. However, scholars acknowledge that customers prepare for the 
future and utilize an anticipated customer value in their decision-making. For example, 
Bolton, Kannan, and Bramlett (2000) highlight that “...customers make repatronage 
decisions on the basis of their predictions (i.e., expectations) concerning the value of a 
future product / service.” It is precisely this anticipation of future circumstances that 
makes customers defer their ultimate switching decision if there is uncertainty in the 
market. 
3 the custOmeR’s ReaL OptiOn tO sWitch suppLieRs 
Because real options analysis originates from the field of finance, it has only recently 
received more attention in the marketing discipline. It has helped to model phenomena 
such as the offering of perishable goods (Finch, Becherer, and Casavant (1998)), the 
evaluation of strategic investments (Slater, Venkateshwar, and Zwirlein (1998)). Other 
studies examine the supplier’s perspective on customer-lifetime value (Haenlein, 
Customer Value
sbr 65  april 2013  112-136 117
Kaplan, and Schoder (2006); Hogan and Hibbard (2002); Levett, Page, Nel, Pitt, 
Berthon, and Money (1999); Roemer (2007)). In this paper we apply real options 
analysis to investigate the customer value construct from a customer’s perspective.
A real option denotes a particular representation of a financial option. Generally, a 
financial call option on an asset “… gives the right, with no obligation, to acquire the 
underlying asset by paying a prespecified price (the exercise price) on or before a given 
maturity” (Trigeorgis, 1996). In contrast, a put option “… gives the right to sell (or 
exchange) the underlying asset and receive the exercise price” (Trigeorgis, 1996). For 
financial options, the underlying asset might represent a stock, a bond, or an index. 
Analogous to financial options, a “… real option is the right, but not the obligation, 
to take an action ... at a predetermined cost ... for a predetermined period of time” 
(Copeland and Antikarov (2001)). Investors usually hold many different kinds of 
real options, since they may be able to defer, expand, contract, abandon, or otherwise 
modify an investment project at various stages of its life cycle. This flexibility allows 
them to take advantage of a favorable future and uncertain conditions, or to minimize 
losses if market conditions deteriorate. Real options capture the value of the flexibility 
in investment projects.
Investors are interested in assessing the value of their options. Therefore, in the 
beginning of the 1970s, Black and Scholes (1973) and Myers (1977) developed option-
pricing models to measure the value of financial options. These models determine 
the present value of an option to buy or sell an uncertain asset in future. Since this 
valuation issue can be transferred to real investments, an investor can also use these 
option-pricing models to value real investment projects that are affected by uncertainty. 
(We note that we use the terms “value” and “present value” interchangeably in relation 
to real options.) Therefore, scholars in finance use option pricing methods to assess real 
investment projects under uncertainty. This method is known as “real option analysis” 
(Dixit and Pindyck (1994); Trigeorgis (1996); Trigeorgis and Mason (1987)). 
The concept of real options is wholly appropriate for analyzing loyalty in customer-
firm relationships. Transferred to the analysis of loyalty in relationships, real options 
give customers the right, but not the obligation, to switch suppliers when prices in the 
market are uncertain. Moreover, if a supplier’s price for a product or service fluctuates, 
the customer can wait and see how prices develop. In future, the customer can then make 
the optimal decision whether to stay with a supplier or switch to a new one. Generally, 
customers can maximize their customer value by deciding on whether or not to exercise 
their real options to switch.
Underlying the real options framework, there are some assumptions to observe for our 
analysis. In real options analysis, individuals act under uncertainty, i.e., they are usually 
able to foresee a certain set of future states. For each future state, the individual can assign 
different probabilities, which enables that person to perform a discounted value analysis. 
Moreover, we assume that the individual will behave rationally and therefore will choose 
the option that maximizes his or her customer value. 
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These assumptions about customer behavior have also been used as economic primitives 
underlying customer behavior. Individuals can be viewed as utility maximizers who 
evaluate products and services as bundles of characteristics and who act based on expected 
utilities, taking into account the time value of money. In addition to these assumptions, 
real options models typically assume ideal market conditions (Schäfer (1997)):
Prices are common knowledge to all individuals and they are independent of an actor’s 
disposition. 
All individuals have homogeneous expectations and are risk-averse.
There are no transaction costs of searching, information, and enforcement.
There are no taxes.
Risk-free interest rates are known and constant over time.
 Although these assumptions may appear to be somewhat abstract, they can be justified for 
our analysis and application of real options analysis. According to Grewal, Iyer, Krishnan, 
and Sharma (2003), the transparency of price information available on the Internet 
obviates the traditional information asymmetry that exists between the buyer and the seller. 
Therefore, it is plausible to assume that prices, e.g., for health insurance, energy or mobile 
phone tariffs, are available to everyone and thus are common knowledge. Moreover, these 
prices are independent of an individual’s personal inclinations, since they are a result of 
market forces. Because information on prices is widely available to all individuals, we can 
suspect that expectations on prices will be similar. Moreover, individuals are risk-averse 
actors, i.e., they regard losses as having more impact than equal-sized gains (Kahneman 
and Tversky (1979)). Further, we can abstract from taxes for simplification, since taxes 
seem to be a less important factor in customers’ decision-making. And we can assume 
that transaction costs can either be regarded as switching costs or otherwise are minimal. 
Apart from switching costs, which we explicitly take into account, we treat markets as 
frictionless. Because of the efficient distribution of financial information on the Internet, 
it is also possible that risk-free interest rates are known to individuals (e.g, interest rates 
on long-term bonds). These interest rates are largely stable over time, although there may 
be slight variations. In our analysis, we abstract from these variations. 
To explore the real options value to switch suppliers (W) as a new element of customer 
value, in addition to those already identified in the marketing literature, we consider 
the following findings. According to Cannon and Homburg (2001) and Ulaga and 
Eggert (2006), the net customer value (NCV) equals the expected difference between 
the customer’s benefits and the customer’s costs that result from an exchange with a 
supplier. 
In addition to the traditional conception of NCV, we consider that future benefits and/
or costs are uncertain. In particular, we incorporate fluctuating prices into the NCV 
construct. Therefore, NCV is no longer a static construct, but serves as a net present 
value (NPV) in which the customer projects different NCV scenarios and discounts 
them to the present date (Hogan (2001)). 
3 We assume that expectations are homogeneous, although in reality they may deviate from each other. 
n
n
n
n
n
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Because NCV is affected by uncertainty, flexibility becomes valuable for customers 
if they choose to wait and/or switch suppliers. Therefore, in an environment that is 
affected by uncertainty, the value of the flexibility to switch suppliers is an additional 
important element of the customer value construct. Therefore, we add an option 
premium W to the net customer value construct. The total customer value (CV), as 
perceived by the customer, is then:
CV = NCV + W. (1)
The option premium W consists of a deterministic component (actual switching value) 
and a stochastic component (value to defer). The actual switching value is the net profit 
that a customer could gain from immediately switching suppliers. It represents the 
intrinsic value of the real option to switch. We calculate the actual switching value as 
the difference between the new, and the incumbent, supplier’s NCV minus switching 
costs. The value to defer represents the time value of the real option to switch. The 
time value stems from the customer’s possibility to wait before deciding to switch 
suppliers and thus gather new information on the market and learn how prices develop. 
This new information is valuable to the customer since he or she can make better, 
value maximizing decisions with the new information than without the information. 
The unique time value is also captured in real options to defer. To account for the two 
components of W, we alter Equation (1) to
CV = NCV + actual switching value + value to defer  (2)
Although the actual switching value is relatively easy to determine, the value to defer 
is a much more complex challenge. Margrabe’s (1978) option model for exchanging 
one risky asset for another is a suitable approach to determine both switching option 
components. This model provides a solution to assessing a real option to switch 
between two different suppliers whose delivered net customer values are uncertain. 
In financial terms, this model represents a combination of a put option, i.e., the 
abandonment of the incumbent supplier, and a call option, i.e., the start-up of a 
relationship with a new supplier.  
To understand the model, we assume that a customer has a relationship with a supplier 
A. The prices of the products or services that the supplier provides fluctuate over 
time. Other customer value elements, such as the customer benefits, remain constant. 
Consequently, the customer’s net value from the relationship with supplier A (NCVA) is 
uncertain. We use Margrabe’s (1978) switching option model to analyze the customer’s 
value to switch suppliers. The Appendix contains the formal derivation of the formula. 
Table 1 summarizes the factors that have an impact on the real switching option’s value 
and their contribution to the option value W.
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Table 1:  Option Value Components
Parameters Element of W
nCV from the existing insurer (A) actual switching Value
nCV from the new insurer (B) actual switching Value
switching costs (K) actual switching Value
time to maturity (t*) Value to defer
Volatility premium rates current insurer A (σS) Value to defer
Volatility premium rates new insurer B (σR) Value to defer
Correlation between σA and σB (ρAB) Value to defer
4 a case anaLysis Of sWitching OptiOns in the geRman pubLic heaLth  
insuRance maRket 
4.1	general	
In this section we use a numerical example to answer the questions of what the value is 
of the option to switch suppliers in a real market setting, how substantial the value is 
of the option to switch suppliers, and how the input factors influence the value of the 
option to switch suppliers, and to illustrate the real options approach. 
We also use a sensitivity analysis to demonstrate the option value’s behavior when input 
factors vary. The sensitivity analysis consists of seven different scenarios, including a 
base case (Scenario 1) and variations of this base case (Scenarios 2 to 7). Furthermore, 
the sensitivity analysis indicates the extent to which variations in the parameters, such 
as different suppliers’ net customer values, time to maturity, volatilities, and switching 
costs, can lead to differences in customer value when compared to the base case.
Different markets, such as the mobile telephone, electricity or insurance markets, are 
suitable for computing the two components of the customer’s value to switch suppliers 
by using Margrabe’s (1978) option model. However, there are some conditions that 
should be met. Several characteristics make the German public health insurance market a 
particularly suitable example for modeling the customer’s value to switch suppliers (Laske-
Aldershof et al. (2004)). First, health insurance is a typical example of a continuously 
provided service (Bolton (1998)). The continuous nature of the service creates long-
term customer-firm relationships. Such relationships continue automatically unless the 
customer explicitly terminates the relationship. Second, the market has a limited product 
differentiation. Optimally, the services supplied should offer homogeneous benefits, but 
they should differ in price. Third, the services’ premiums vary strongly, ranging from 
12.2% to 15.7% of an employee’s gross income (data from 2004 as reported by Aldershof 
et al. (2004)). Fourth, consumers have the right, but not the obligation to switch insurers. 
Although we choose health insurance for our analysis, we note that the model is applicable 
to a wide range of industries. For example, relationships between mobile phone service 
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providers and their customers comply with conditions similar to those mentioned above, 
e.g., mobile phone services are continuously provided and relationships are long-term, 
services are relatively homogeneous in nature, prices are transparent and vary constantly, 
and customers have the right to switch suppliers despite incurring switching costs.  Our 
health-care case study can also be applied to the relationships between utilities (e.g., 
electricity, gas) and their customers, since their products and services are homogeneous and 
delivered on a continuous basis.  The relationships can also be cancelled, but are mostly 
long-term in nature; and prices fluctuate constantly and are transparent to the customer.  
By applying the switching option model to the example of the German public health 
insurance industry, we compute the base case. 
4.2	Base	Case	
The point of departure for our base case is a health insurance customer whose 
gross monthly income is €3,000. Public health insurance companies in Germany 
charge a premium as a percentage of this income. The employee pays half of the 
premium, and the employer pays the other half. If the employee is a customer of the 
Allgemeine Ortskrankenkassen (AOK) Mecklenburg-Vorpommern, which charges 
a 14% premium (August 2005), the customer’s monthly premium amounts to €210 
(€3,000 × 0.14 × 0.5). The customer has a choice of several alternative suppliers. The 
Techniker Krankenkasse (TK) is an insurer that the customer believes offers similar 
services and coverage. TK charges a premium rate of only 12.8%, which equals a 
monthly premium of €192. Thus, the customer might see TK as the most attractive 
alternative, and use it as a benchmark. Since the value dimension is easier to trace 
than are pure cost savings, examining the net customer values is preferable to prices 
or cost savings arguments. If the benefits of the insurance service are quantifiable and 
amount to €1,000 for both insurers, then the net customer value of AOK Mecklenburg-
Vorpommern equals €790 and that of TK €808. However, in our base case we do not 
consider switching costs.
The volatility of the premiums originates from factors that are inherent in the common 
market, such as the economic (e.g., unemployment rate) and political (e.g., regulation) 
situations, and from provider-specific factors, such as the insurer’s contingency risk due 
to its customer base and pricing policy. As our proxy for the volatility in the premium 
rates of different health insurers in Germany for n months we use the standard 
deviation, which we define as
s =   
 √
______________
    1 ____ 
n – 1
 ∑
i = 1
 
n
  (ui – u)
2    with ui = ln  
NCVi _____
NCVi – 1
 . (5)
We use monthly premium rates from January 1996 to December 2004 to estimate s. 
The premiums’ volatilities per year are then s times    √
___
 12. Deflating the premium 
rates by using the German Verbraucherpreisindex (VPI) leads to the estimated volatility 
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of real premiums. For the base case, the volatility of the current insurer AOK between 
January 1996 and December 2004 is very low (σNCVA = 1.52%), but TK’s premium 
rates fluctuate more significantly (σNCVA = 4.36%). The correlation ρNCVA,NCVB 
between the premiums is 0.419.
If the AOK customer considers switching to TK in three months’ time, so that 
t* – t = 0.25, the value of the real option to switch W equals €19. W represents 
the customer’s option to switch insurers and increases the total customer value. This 
value needs to be added to the customer’s NCV to deliver the total customer value of 
€809. The actual value of switching is €18 in this case, which is the difference between 
the insurers’ premiums and the customer’s difference in net customer value. Moreover, 
W results from the customer’s option to defer switching in the future and from the 
insurance premiums’ uncertainty. In this case, the customer values the flexibility to 
wait and see how the different insurers’ premiums will develop at €1 (value to defer), 
which is the difference between €19 and €18. Table 2 presents an overview of the 
results of the base case, including its variations, Scenarios 2 to 7. 
Table 2:  Scenario Summary
Scenario Parameter Values Option Value
Base case
1) expected nCV* from current insurer A = € 790 (premium rate 14.0%) 
expected nCV from new insurer B = € 808 (premium rate 12.8%) 
switching costs (K) = 0 
time to maturity = 3 months (0.25 year) 
Volatility of current insurer’s rates (σNCVS) = 1.52% 
Volatility of new insurer’s rates (σNCVR) = 4.36% 
Correlation between σS and σR (ρNCVS,NCVR) = 0.419
€ 19.02
Variations
2) Increased time to maturity  
time to maturity = 12 months (1 year)
€ 23.64 (Δ = € 4.62)
3) Increased Volatility of out-supplier R 
Volatility of new insurer’s rates (σNCVR) = 7%
€ 21.77 (Δ = € 2.75)
4) Increased Volatility of In-supplier S 
Volatility of current insurer’s rates (σNCVS) = 7%
€ 21.77 (Δ = € 2.75)
5)  Increased Value of out-supplier R 
expected nCV from new supplier R = € 820 (premium rate 12.0%)
€ 30.19 (Δ = € 11.17)
6) Increased switching Costs 
switching costs (K) = € 10
€ 11.08 (Δ = € -7.93)
7) reduced Correlation between σNCVS and σNCVR 
Correlation between σNCVS and σNCVR (ρNCVS,NCVR) = –0.419
€ 19.61 (Δ = € 0.59)
* nCV = net Customer Value
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4.3	 time	to	maturity
To study the impact of the different parameters on the option value and the customer 
value, we present six scenarios that differ from the base case. One input factor of the 
real options value is the time to maturity, which is the time the customer has to wait 
before being able to switch. Either the option holders themselves can determine the time 
to maturity by defining a future point in time at which they want to switch, and thus 
determine what period of time that they choose to wait, or factors outside the customer’s 
control, such as legal constraints or contractually accorded periods of notice. 
If the customer is prepared to wait a whole year before switching instead of three months, 
then the option value W increases to €24 (Scenario 2). This effect is typical of volatile 
markets. The longer the time that is available before switching to a new insurer, the 
more time there is for customers to observe the health insurance market and different 
insurers’ premium rates. This waiting time provides customers with the opportunity to see 
how premium rates develop and to gather new information on competitive offers. This 
opportunity, in turn, adds to the value to defer switching to a future point in time. For 
a reduced time to maturity, for instance, zero, the option value declines to €18, which is 
exactly the difference between the two insurers’ premiums. With increasing time to maturity 
to exercise the option, the value of the option to defer switching increases degressively. 
Figure 1 shows the impact of increasing time to maturity on the real options value.
Figure 1:  Option Value as a Function of Time to Maturity
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4.4	 Volatility	of	insurers’	premium	rates	
Volatility represents the changes in insurers’ premium rates. This volatility contributes 
to the customer’s option value to defer switching and to see how the market develops 
before deciding to switch insurers. To illustrate these results, we present two scenarios 
with different levels of volatility. Scenario 3 illustrates a situation in which the new 
insurer’s premium rates are more volatile than are those in the base case. When the new 
insurer’s volatility reaches the level of 7% compared to the lower level of 4.4% in the 
base case, the value of the option to switch insurers increases to €22, compared to €19 
in the base case. In Scenario 4, the incumbent insurer’s premium volatility increases to 
7%. Again, the option value W increases to €22 compared to €19 in the base case. In 
both cases, increased volatilities contribute to the value of deferring switching in W. 
This positive association between volatilities and the option value is typical of real 
options analysis. Real options theory suggests that as long as a customer remains 
flexible, he or she can react and thus make use of this price uncertainty by responding 
to it. This argument is linked to the time-to-maturity argument, since the longer a 
customer’s waiting time is, the higher the downside potential of the premiums will be. 
Figure 2 illustrates the behavior of the real options value in relation to the increasing 
time to maturity of the new insurer B’s different volatilities (base case volatility equals 
4.4% and Scenario 3 equals 7%).
Figure 2:  Option Value as a Function of Time to Maturity for Different Volatilities
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4.5		insurers’	premium	rates	and	nCVs	
The insurers’ premium rates have a direct impact on NCV, since the premium represents 
the customer’s most important sacrifice. Therefore, cutting insurance premiums is 
equivalent to an increase in NCVs. Because the NCV is the underlying asset of the real 
option to defer switching, an increase in NCV affects the value of the option to defer 
switching. In Scenario 5, TK’s premium rates might, for instance, fall to 12% compared 
to the base case. Hence, the expected net customer value from the new insurer will 
rise by €12 to €820. The value of the customer’s real option to switch then equals €30. 
Further, the growth in one insurer’s NCV (€12) results in a slightly smaller increase in 
option value (€11). Since changes in NCV directly affect the difference in value between 
the insurers, these effects have an impact on the actual switching value.
4.6		switChing	Costs	
We use an extension of Margrabe’s (1978) model to investigate the effect of switching 
costs on the value of the option to switch insurers. If switching costs increase to €10 
(Scenario 6), the value of the option to switch insurers is reduced to €11. Therefore, 
switching costs have an immediate negative impact on the actual switching value, since 
they directly reduce the attractiveness of switching to alternative insurers. 
In Figure 3, the solid line shows the value of the option to defer switching and the area to 
the right of the dashed line in which the switching costs exceed the potential gain from 
switching insurers. Even if switching costs exceed the possible gain from switching suppliers, 
the value of the option to defer remains positive due to the value of deferring switching. 
Figure 3:  Option Value as a Function of Switching Costs
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4.7		Correlation	Between	the	two	insurers’	priCe	premium	Volatilities	
The correlation between the two insurers’ price premium volatilities represents 
the degree of the insurers’ NCV comovements. A high correlation indicates that 
price fluctuations result from common causes such as market characteristics. A low 
correlation signifies that price fluctuations depend on circumstances unique to each 
insurer. 
Comparing the base case (ρNCVA,NCVB = 0.419) with Scenario 7, in which the 
correlation of the insurer’s premium volatilities is zero (ρNCVA,NCVB = 0), highlights the 
consequences of suppliers’ NCVs being uncorrelated. The decrease in correlation results 
in an increase in the option value (€19.61). A lower correlation has a positive impact on 
option values, since a customer can benefit most from switching when both volatilities are 
unrelated, and hence can profit from having exchanged one insurer for another. 
5  discussiOn 
5.1		impliCations	for	theory	
We believe that our paper has important implications for marketing theory, especially 
for relationship marketing, which deals with customer value and loyalty. We present 
the value of the option to switch as a new element of customer construct, which has 
so far received very little attention. Our study shows that two components contribute 
to this option value: the actual switching value and the value of deferring switching. 
The actual switching value relates to the difference in net customer value between two 
suppliers, which could be reduced by switching costs; the value of deferring switching 
is evoked by uncertainty about future prices. Customers can maximize their value of 
deferring switching by waiting, which results in behavioral loyalty in a relationship 
with a supplier. A large body of research, mainly rooted in relationship marketing (cf. 
Nijssen et al. (2003); Ravald and Grönroos (1996)) emphasizes the pivotal role that 
customer value plays in creating customer loyalty. Because customer value mediates the 
effects of all major customer relationship variables on customer loyalty (Sirdeshmukh 
et al. (2002)), we can deduce that ultimately the value of the real option to switch has a 
positive impact on customer loyalty. Therefore, we formulate the following proposition:
Proposition 1: The more a customer values the option to switch, the more loyal the 
customer is. 
The value of deferring switching enhances the option value, since customers can wait 
and see how prices develop in uncertain markets. The longer the customer can wait 
and learn, the higher the value of this option will be. The higher the uncertainty of 
the suppliers’ net customer values, the higher the value of the option to defer switching 
becomes. Figure 2 illustrates the positive impact of volatility and time to maturity. 
These two input factors drive the value of deferring. Thus, the sensitivity analysis gives 
rise to the following propositions: 
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Proposition 2: The higher the uncertainty about the future market development, the more a 
customer values the option to switch. 
Proposition 3: The longer a customer can defer switching to a new supplier, the more the 
customer values the option to switch.
These results are essential for the development of the customer value construct and for 
research on behavioral loyalty. Since the option to defer switching substantially enhances 
the customer value in the presence of uncertainty, option values need to be included as an 
additional component in the customer value construct. 
Our paper illustrates the applicability of real options analysis as a new method for 
investigating customer value. By using this approach to assess the value of a customer’s 
real option to switch from one supplier to another, the researcher can further elaborate 
the nomological network of the real option to switch in relationships. Figure 4 depicts the 
nomological network of the real option to switch. 
Figure 4:  A Nomological Network for the Option to Switch
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5.2	 impliCations	for	management	praCtiCe	
The results of our study can have major importance for marketing management 
practice. 
Suppliers can influence the actual switching value by changing the net customer value 
and/or switching costs. However, suppliers must differentiate between customers who 
truly appreciate the actual switching value and wish to retain this value, which they 
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will do by displaying behavioral loyalty, and customers who prefer to cash in on the 
actual switching value and benefit from switching suppliers rather than staying in the 
present relationship. 
Customers who cash in are more focused on the immediate benefits. For them, the 
traditional implications hold true. The current supplier’s aim is to reduce the customer’s 
actual switching value by, for example, increasing switching costs, thus making switching 
less attractive (e.g., Morgan and Hunt (1994); Wathne, Biong, and Heide (2001)). For 
instance, the provider might include switching costs in the contract between the company 
and a customer by imposing a cancellation fee if the customer were to switch suppliers. 
Moreover, current suppliers could increase the benefits perceived by the customer by, for 
example, including new functional or symbolic benefits. The would-be suppliers pursue 
the opposite aim, increasing the actual switching value and making switching more 
attractive to this group of customers. Other possible means of achieving this aim are to 
reduce, or even assume, switching costs. Some service providers, such as banks, assume 
that the customer’s switching costs increase actual switching values, so that customers are 
more likely to switch. Another method is to increase and communicate the higher benefits 
available from the would-be supplier, making the offer more attractive to the customer.
There are also other customers who appreciate the flexibility to switch, and who would 
like to retain this value as a part of their customer value. To preserve this value for these 
customers, current suppliers will try to increase or retain the actual switching value. 
Consequently, current suppliers might even reduce the switching costs or slightly increase 
prices, thus increasing both the actual switching value and the customer value. This 
implication runs counter to the traditional relationship marketing literature. To make use of 
this implication, there must be a group of customers who appreciate having the flexibility to 
choose a supplier. However, the value of this flexibility enhances the current customer value, 
which encourages customers to remain in relationships rather than switching immediately. 
Would-be suppliers can persuade such customers over to their side by making them aware 
of the actual value to be had from switching, which is only valuable in monetary terms if the 
customer actually switches suppliers. Would-be suppliers might use their communication 
strategies to stress the benefit of cashing in the actual switching value. 
Both the uncertainty of future price developments and the time available to the customer 
to observe such developments can result in the value of deferring switching. Since the latter 
is a future value and customers cannot be directly reimbursed for this value, a distinction 
need not be made between whether customers truly appreciate the actual switching value 
or not. Price uncertainty benefits current suppliers, since customers who might wish to stay 
in the relationship would want to observe the market before switching. Current suppliers 
can use this effect in different ways. For example, they could try to influence and increase 
customers’ perceptions of uncertainty in the market, perhaps by emphasizing uncertainty 
in their marketing communications. Moreover, they could try to induce uncertainty by 
frequently changing customer value parameters such as price. Another way of increasing 
the value of deferring switching would be to extend the customers’ planning horizons for 
example, by increasing notice periods. A longer time to maturity increases a customer’s 
preference for staying in relationships. Moreover, current suppliers should free themselves 
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from market trends, thus making it possible for them to reduce the correlation with other 
suppliers’ NCV volatilities and to enhance the value of deferring switching.
Would-be suppliers are interested in ways to make customers switch. It is in their interest 
to camouflage the uncertainty. For instance, they could reduce the customers’ perceived 
price uncertainty by communicating that they will not be receiving cheaper offers in 
future. Alternatively, the would-be supplier could offer a fixed advantage that is better 
compared to that of their competitor, such as “With us, you always pay x% less than 
with any competitor.” In both these ways, would-be suppliers suggest to their potential 
future customers that they cannot maximize their value by deferring the switching decision. 
Moreover, would-be suppliers must communicate that deferring switching to the future is 
not worthwhile by, for example, limiting the time of special offers. This message will reduce 
the value of deferring switching and thus make customers switch at an earlier stage. 
In addition, suppliers can try to assess customer values in monetary terms. To do so, 
information is necessary on the input variables to the customer value construct. In a 
business-to-consumer context, this information is usually not readily available for a large 
group of different customers. One solution might be to estimate a scope for the input 
variables and thus a scope for the customer values and switching option values. Another 
solution might be to estimate maxima for the cost components and minima for the 
benefit components of customer value so that a lower bound of customer value could 
be calculated. Such a monetary analysis of customer value might also serve as a basis for 
value-based segmentation. 
In contrast, in a business-to-business context the information on the input variables to 
the model may be much more precise, since suppliers and customers often have close 
relationships and share confidential information. In this case, the current supplier 
can more easily calculate a specific monetary customer value. The supplier can then 
use that value to retain customers, e.g., by making it transparent to the customer and 
demonstrating the value of staying with an incumbent supplier (i.e., preserve value to 
defer switching). Or, if the company is a would-be supplier, it could demonstrate the value 
to the customer to cash in the actual switching value.
5.3	 Consumer	BehaVior	in	the	light	of	the	real	option	to	switCh	
Customers’ decisions to switch providers can be regarded as a specific problem of 
intertemporal choice. It has generated a substantial stream of research for almost 200 years 
(c.f. Rae (1834)). Although we use a business-to-consumer context for the simulation 
study, we take into account only market-level information. We do not explicitly model the 
consumer’s choice.  In particular, we model the objective value of the real option to switch. 
However, consumers will more likely base their behavior on the perceived value of the real 
option to switch, which can be different. This difference is attributable to two main reasons. 
First, consumers rely on available information, which may be imperfect, incomplete, and/
or obsolete, to judge whether they can replace their current customer-firm relationship 
with one that is more valuable (Alba, Hutchinson and Lynch (1991); Kardes, (1994)). 
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Second, consumers differ substantially from utility maximizers, leading to anomalies in 
standard economic models. Loewenstein and Prelec (1992) identify four such anomalies: 
the common difference effect, the absolute magnitude effect, the gain-loss asymmetry, and 
the delay-speedup asymmetry. The common difference effect says that preferences between 
two delayed outcomes often switch when both delays are shifted by a constant amount of 
time. Thaler (1981) illustrates this effect with the following example: While some consumers 
would prefer to obtain one apple today over two apples tomorrow, no consumer would 
prefer one apple in one year over two apples in one year plus one day. 
The absolute magnitude effect is that “… large dollar amounts suffer less proportional 
discounting than do small ones” (Loewenstein and Prelec (1992)). The gain-loss 
asymmetry refers to Thaler’s (1981) finding that discount rates are much smaller for losses 
than for gains, and in many instances may even be negative. According to Zauberman 
(2003), “… [o]ne of the most established research findings on inter-temporal choice is 
that individuals behave as if they have high discount rates.” Future gains have a much 
lower value than current gains, and must be relatively large in order to overcome current 
losses. 
According to the delay-speedup asymmetry, consumers exhibit an asymmetric preference 
between speeding up and delaying consumption (Loewenstein (1988)), i.e. when people 
choose between immediate and delayed consumption, the reference point used to evaluate 
alternatives is likely to influence choice.
These asymmetries may have complex and interacting effects on the antecedents of the 
value of the real option to switch, such as time to maturity, discount rate, switching costs, 
and the value gained by switching providers. For instance, the switching costs and the 
value gained by switching providers may be affected by the common difference effect and 
the absolute magnitude effect. The discount rate is most probably subject to the gain-loss 
asymmetry; the time to maturity might be influenced by the delay-speedup asymmetry. 
Because of the compound nature of the real option to switch, it is not possible to predict 
the impact of all the consumer anomalies on the real options value as perceived by 
consumers. Empirical research is needed to disentangle the various, partially conflicting, 
effects to fully understand how the objective value of the real option to switch relates to 
consumers’ evaluation of the option to switch.
5.4	 limitations	and	extensions	
There are a few limitations to this study, which open up avenues for future research. We 
apply Margrabe’s (1978) switching option model to the real options model for the value of 
a customer’s option to switch suppliers in uncertain markets. Although the model fits well 
with the situation in which the customer switches suppliers, we note some limitations. 
First, the stochastic process assumed in Margrabe’s model may be different from the 
uncertain NCV, which means that NCV may develop differently than we assume in 
our model. Second, although we have carefully derived the three propositions, empirical 
testing is desirable. Therefore, an interesting and necessary next step in this research could 
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be to empirically examine how customers perceive the value of the option to switch − 
including the two option value components of actual switching value and value of 
deferring switching − and how this value causes loyalty.
Future analyses could include different types of real options in relationships, and 
subsequently extend the range of applications of real options analysis in marketing and 
beyond. In business research, there are also other types of real options that are worth 
exploring in more detail, such as the option to expand or contract relationships, or to 
defer investments in relationships. Thus, future work in business research might strongly 
benefit from real options analysis as a tool that supports the analysis of both companies’ 
and consumers’ decision-making in the face of uncertainty.
appendix 
To model the uncertainty of health insurance premiums and thus uncertainty in the 
net customer value in the relationship with supplier A (NCVA), we use a stochastic 
process that moves up and down in continuous time with an upward trend, since it 
is likely that health insurance premiums grow in the long run due to increasing price 
levels of medical services and pharmaceutical products and because of a higher average 
age of patients. A stochastic process that reflects these characteristics is a geometric 
Brownian motion with drift, which is typical of the modeling of uncertainty in real 
option analysis: 
dNCVA = µNCVANCVAdt + σNCVA NCVA dzNCVA. (3)
In this formula, µNCVS denotes the expected growth rate of NCVS. The standard 
deviation of NCVS, which is σNCVS, characterizes the expected volatility of NCVS, 
and dzNCVS is the increment of a standard Wiener process with dzNCVS ~ N(0, dt). 
When the process starts, the net value from supplier S is known as of day 1.  However, 
future values are lognormal distributed so that supplier S’s value can never be negative. 
Otherwise, the customer would exit the relationship. Moreover, the variance of NCVS 
grows linearly over time, thus reflecting higher variance of forecasts the further 
forecasts are projected into the future. 
Furthermore, we assume that there is at least one alternative supplier, so that the 
customer has the option to switch to a new supplier R whose price is also affected by 
uncertainty. The customer perceives that supplier R’s offering is identical except for the 
prices, which may differ. As the price of the product/service fluctuates, we can model 
the net customer value from the new supplier R (NCVR) in analogy to Equation (3) 
with µNCVR as the expected growth rate of NCVR, σNCVR as the expected volatility in 
NCVR, and dzNCVR as the increment of a standard Wiener process with dzNCVR ~ 
N(0, dt). The correlation between the two Wiener processes dzNCVS and dzNCVR, is 
ρNCVS,NCVR. The option to switch, which entails exchanging one supplier for another, is a 
European option that can only be exercised at a certain point of time in the future (t*). 
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If the customer switches from supplier S to the new supplier R, he or she will be likely 
to incur switching costs K (Burnham et al., 2003). In real options terms, this implies 
that K increases the exercise price of the option to switch. If the customer wants to 
exercise the option to switch, then he or she needs to pay K as switching costs (exercise 
price). This in turn reduces the actual switching value, since the switching costs reduce 
the difference in customer value between two suppliers. 
A straightforward way to include switching costs in the model is to add a lump sum 
to the exercise price. By modifying Margrabe’s (1978) option model to take switching 
costs into account, the value of the customer’s option to defer switching from 
incumbent supplier S to the new supplier R equals
W(NCVR, NCVS, K, t) = NCVR N(d1) – (NCVS + K) N(d2) (4)
having d1 =  
ln(NCVR/(NCVS  + K)) +  1 _2 σ²(t* – t)
    ________________________________ 
σ   √
______
 t* – t
  and d2 = d1 – σ 
 
 √
______
 t* – t.
W  = the value of the option to switch from one risky supplier S to a new  
 risky supplier R
NCVR = the expected net value from the new supplier R
NCVS = the expected net value from the current supplier S
K = switching costs
N(·) = the cumulative standard normal density function
t* = the date of the exercise of the option (date of switching from supplier  
 S to supplier R)
σ² = the variance of σ2NCVR – 2σNCVR σNCVS ρNCVS,NCVR + σ
2
NCVS
σNCVS = volatility of NCVS
σNCVR = volatility of NCVR
ρNCVS,NCVR = correlation between σNCVS and σNCVR
The first part in Equation (4) indicates the current customer’s NCV, which is a present 
value affected by uncertainty in the price premiums. The second part in Equation (4) 
relates to the present value of an alternative supplier’s NCV, which is also affected by 
uncertainty, plus switching costs K that the customer needs to take into account when 
he or she wants to switch. The value of the option to switch suppliers is either positive 
or zero. In the latter case, the customer would not consider the option of switching 
to an alternative supplier, since the alternative supplier would provide a much lower 
value than the current relationship. Thus, even a better competing offer in the future 
appears very unlikely. Due to the very nature of an option, i.e., that it is a right, not an 
obligation, its value can never be negative.
Customer Value
sbr 65  april 2013  112-136 133
RefeRences
Agustín, Clara and Jagdip Singh (2005), Curvilinear effects of consumer loyalty determinants in relational exchanges, 
Journal of Marketing Research, 42 (1), 96–108.
Alba, Joseph W., J. Wesley Hutchinson, and John G. Lynch(1991), Memory and decision-making, in Thomas 
S. Robertson and Harold H. Kassarjian (eds.), Handbook of Consumer Behavior, Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice 
Hall, 1–49.
Anderson, James C. and James A. Narus (2004), Business Market Management: Understanding, Creating, and Deliver-
ing Value, Upper Saddle River, NJ: Pearson.
Black, Fischer and Myron S. Scholes (1973), The pricing of options and corporate liabilities, Journal of Political 
Economy, 81 (3), 637–54.
Bolton, Ruth N. (1998), A dynamic model of the duration of the customer´s relationship with a continuous service 
provider: The role of satisfaction, Marketing Science, 17 (1), 45–65.
Bolton, Ruth N., P. K. Kannan, and Matthew D. Bramlett (2000), Implications of loyalty program membership 
and service experiences for customer retention and value, Journal of the Academy of Marketing Science, 28 (1), 
95–108.
Brady, Michael K. and Christopher J. Robertson (2001), Searching for a consensus on the antecedent role of service 
quality and satisfaction: an exploratory cross-national study, Journal of Business Research, 51 (1), 53–60.
Brennan, Michael J. and Eduardo S. Schwartz (1985), Evaluating natural resource investments, Journal of Business, 
58 (2), 135–155.
Bundesnetzagentur (2010), Monitoringbericht 2010, Bonn: Bundesnetzagentur für Elektrizität, Gas, Telekommuni-
kation, Post und Eisenbahnen.
Burnham, Thomas A., Judy K. Frels, and Vijay Mahajan (2003), Consumer switching costs: a typology, antecedents, 
and consequences, Journal of the Academy of Marketing Science, 31 (2), 109–126.
Cannon, Joseph P. and Christian Homburg (2001), Buyer–supplier relationships and customer firm costs, Journal of 
Marketing, 65 (1), 29–43.
Chiu, Hung-Chang, Yi-Ching Hsieh, Yu-Chuan Li, and Monle Lee (2005), Relationship marketing and consumer 
switching behavior, Journal of Business Research, 58 (12), 1681–1689.
Copeland, Tom and Vladimir Antikarov (2001), Real Options: A Practitioner’s Guide. New York: Texere.
Dasu, Sriram and Lode Li (1997), Optimal operating policies in the presence of exchange rate variability, Management 
Science, 43 (5), 705–722.
Dixit, Avinash K. and Robert S. Pindyck (1994), Investment under Uncertainty, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University 
Press.
Durvasula, Srinivas, Steven Lysonski, Subhash Mehta, and Buck Peng Tang (2004), Forging relationships with ser-
vices: the antecedents that have an impact on behavioral outcomes in the life insurance industry. Journal of 
Financial Services Marketing, 6 (4), 314–326.
Finch, J. Howard, Richard C. Becherer, and Richard Casavant (1998), An option-based approach for pricing perish-
able services assets. Journal of Services Marketing, 12 (6), 473–483.
Fornell, Claes (1992), A national customer satisfaction barometer: the Swedish experience. Journal of Marketing, 56 
(1), 6–21.
Ganesan, Shankar (1994), Determinants of long-term orientation in buyer-seller relationships, Journal of Marketing, 
58 (4), 1–19.
Garbarino, Ellen and Mark S. Johnson (1999), The different roles of satisfaction, trust, and commitment in customer 
relationships, Journal of Marketing, 63 (2), 70–87. 
Grewal, Druhv, Gopalkrishnan R. Iyer, R. Krishnan, and Arun Sharma (2003), The Internet and the price-value-
loyalty chain, Journal of Business Research, (56) 5, 391–398.
J. Henseler/e. roemer
  
 sbr 65  april 2013  112-136134
Grisaffe, Douglas B. and Anand Kumar(1998), Antecedents and consequences of customer value: testing an expanded 
framework, MSI Working Paper Report, No. 98–107, Cambridge, MA: Marketing Science Institute.
Haenlein, Michael, Andreas M. Kaplan, and Detlef Schoder (2006), Valuing the real option of abandoning unprofit-
able customers when calculating customer lifetime value, Journal of Marketing, 70 (3), 5–20.
Harrigan, Kathryn Rudie (1980), Strategy formulation in declining industries, Academy of Management Review, 5 
(4), 599–604.
Heide, Jan B. and George John (1988), The role of dependence balancing in safeguarding transaction-specific assets 
in conventional channels, Journal of Marketing, 52 (1), 20–35.
Heide, Jan B. and George John (1990), Alliances in industrial purchasing: the determinants of joint action in buyer-
supplier relationships, Journal of Marketing Research, 27 (1), 24–36.
Heide, Jan B. and Allen M. Weiss (1995), Vendor consideration and switching behavior for buyers in high-technology 
markets, Journal of Marketing, 59 (3), 30–43.
Hogan, John E. (2001), Expected relationship value: a construct, a methodology for measurement, and a modeling 
technique, Industrial Marketing Management, 30 (4), 339–351.
Hogan, John E. and Jonathan D. Hibbard (2002), A Real Options–Based Framework for Valuing Business Relationships 
as Strategic Assets, working paper, School of Management, Boston University.
Jackson, Barbara B. (1985), Winning and Keeping Industrial Customers. The Dynamics of Customer Relationships. Lex-
ington, MA: Lexington Books.
Kahneman, Daniel and Amos Tversky (1979), Prospect theory: an analysis of decision under risk, Econometrica, 47 
(2), 263–291. 
Kamrad, Bardia and Akhtar Siddique (2004), Supply contracts, profit sharing, switching, and reaction options, 
Management Science, 50 (1), 64–82.
Kardes, Frank R. (1994), Consumer judgment and decision processes, in Robert S. Wyer and Thomas K. Srull (eds.), 
Handbook of Social Cognition, Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, 399–466.
Keaveney, Susan M. (1995), Customer switching behavior in service industries: an exploratory study, Journal of 
Marketing, 59 (2), 71–82.
Kranhold, Kathryn (1997), California’s electric-deregulation plan draws little interest from consumers, Wall Street 
Journal, (Eastern edition), Dec. 31, 1.
Kulatilaka, Nalin (1993), The value of flexibility: the case of a dual-fuel industrial steam boiler, Financial Manage-
ment, 22 (3), 271–280.
Kulatilaka, Nalin and Lenos Trigeorgis (1994), The general flexibility to switch: real options revisited, The Interna-
tional Journal of Finance, 6 (2), 778–798.
Kumar, Anand and Douglas B. Grisaffe (2004), Effects of extrinsic attributes on perceived quality, customer value, 
and behavioral intentions in B2B settings: a comparison across goods and service industries, Journal of Business to 
Business Marketing, 11 (4), 43–74.
Lam, Yin Shun, Venkatesh Shankar, M. Krishna Erramilli, and Bvsan Murthy (2004), Customer value, satisfaction, 
loyalty, and switching costs: an illustration from a business-to-business service context, Journal of the Academy of 
Marketing Science, 32 (3), 293–312.
Lambrecht, Anja, Katja Seim, and Bernd Skiera (2007), Does uncertainty matter? Consumer behaviour under three-
part tariffs, Marketing Science, 26 (5), 698–710.
Langlois, Richard N. (1994), Risk and uncertainty, in Peter J. Boettke (ed.), The Elgar Companion to Austrian Eco-
nomics, Cornwall: Edward Elgar Publishing, 118–122.
Laske-Aldershof, Trea, Erik Schut, Konstantin Beck, Stefan Greß, Amir Shmueli, and Carine van de Voorde (2004), 
Consumer mobility in social health insurance markets: a five-country comparison, Applied Health Economics and 
Health Policy, 3 (4), 229–241.
Customer Value
sbr 65  april 2013  112-136 135
Levett, Peter, Michael Page, Deon Nel, Leyland Pitt, Pierre Berthon, and Arthur Money (1999), Towards an appli-
cation of option pricing theory in the valuation of customer relationships, Journal of Strategic Marketing, 7 (4), 
275–284.
Liu, Annie H., Mark P. Leach, and Kenneth L. Bernhardt (2005), Examining customer value perceptions of organi-
zational buyers when sourcing from multiple vendors, Journal of Business Research, 58 (5), 559–568.
Loewenstein, George F. (1988), Frames of mind in intertemporal choice, Management Science, 34 (2), 200–214.
Loewenstein, George F. and Drazen Prelec (1992), Anomalies in intertemporal choice: Evidence and an interpreta-
tion, The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 107 (2), 573–597.
Margrabe, William (1978), The value of an option to exchange one asset for another, Journal of Finance, 33 (1), 
177–186.
Morgan, Robert M. and Shelby D. Hunt (1994), The commitment-trust theory of relationship marketing, Journal 
of Marketing, 58 (3), 20–38.
Myers, Stewart (1977), Determinants of Corporate Borrowing, Journal of Financial Economics, 5 (2), 147–176.
Nijssen, Edwin J., Jagdip Singh, Deepak Sirdeshmukh, and Hartmut H. Holzmüller (2003), Investigating industry 
context effects in consumer-firm relationships: preliminary results from a dispositional approach. Journal of the 
Academy of Marketing Science, 31 (1), 591–615.
Palmatier, Robert W. (2008), Interfirm relational drivers of customer value, Journal of Marketing 72 (3), 76–89.
Rae, John (1834), Statement of Some New Principles on the Subject of Political Economy: Exposing the Fallacies of the 
System of Free Trade and of Some Other Doctrines Maintained in the “Wealth of Nations,” Boston: Hilliard, Gray 
& Co.
Ralston, Roy W. (2003), The effects of customer service, branding, and price on the perceived value of local telephone 
service, Journal of Business Research, 56 (3), 201–213.
Ravald, Annika and Christian Grönroos (1996), The value concept and relationship marketing, European Journal of 
Marketing, 30 (1), 19–30.
Reichheld, Frederick F. and W. Earl Sasser Jr. (1990), Zero defections: quality comes to services, Harvard Business 
Review, 68 (5), 105–111.
Roemer, Ellen (2007), A typology of customer lifetime values in buyer-seller relationships. Journal of Strategic Market-
ing, 15 (5), 441–457.
Schäfer, Klaus (1997), Finanztermingeschäfte und Optionspreistheorie: Märkte, Anwendungsstrategien und Bewertung von 
Optionen und Futures, 4. Aufl. München: Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München.
Schlesinger, Harris and J. Matthias Graf von der Schulenburg (1993), Consumer information and decisions to switch 
insurer, Journal of Risk and Insurance, 60 (4), 591–615.
Sheth, Jagdeep N. and Atul Parvatiyar (1995), Relationship marketing in consumer markets: antecedents and conse-
quences, Journal of the Academy of Marketing Science, 23 (4), 255–271.
Sirdeshmukh, Deepak, Jagdip Singh, and Barry Sabol (2002), Consumer trust, value and loyalty in relational ex-
changes, Journal of Marketing, 66 (1), 15–37.
Slater, Stanley F., K. Reddy Venkateshwar, and Thomas J. Zwirlein (1998), Evaluating strategic investments: comple-
menting discounted cash flow analysis with options analysis, Industrial Marketing Management, 27 (5), 447–
458.
Spiteri, Joseph M. and Paul A. Dion (2004), Customer value, overall satisfaction, end-user loyalty, and market per-
formance in detail intensive industries, Industrial Marketing Management, 33 (3), 675–687.
Stewart, Kate (1998), An Exploration of Customer Exit in Retail Banking, International Journal of Bank Management, 
16 (1), 6–14.
Thaler, Richard (1981), Some empirical evidence on dynamic inconsistency, Economics Letters, 8 (3), 201–207.
J. Henseler/e. roemer
  
 sbr 65  april 2013  112-136136
Trigeorgis, Lenos (1996), Real Options: Managerial Flexibility and Strategy in Resource Allocation, Cambridge, MA: 
MIT Press.
Trigeorgis, Leons and Scott P. Mason (1987), Valuing managerial flexibility, Midland Corporate Finance Journal, 
Spring, 14–21.
Ulaga, Wolfgang (2001), Customer value in business markets: an agenda for inquiry, Industrial Marketing Manage-
ment, 30 (4), 1–7.
Ulaga, Wolfgang (2003), Capturing value creation in business relationships: a customer perspective, Industrial Market-
ing Management, 32 (8), 677–693.
Ulaga, Wolfgang and Andreas Eggert (2006), Value–based differentiation in business relationships: gaining and sus-
taining key-supplier status, Journal of Marketing, 70 (1), 119–136.
Walsh, Gianfranco, Keith Dinnie, and Klaus–Peter Wiedmann (2006), How do corporate reputation and customer 
satisfaction impact customer defection? A study of private energy customers in Germany, Journal of Services Mar-
keting, 20 (6), 412–420.
Wathne Kenneth H., H. Biong, and Jan B. Heide (2001), Choice of supplier in embedded markets: relationship and 
marketing program effects. Journal of Marketing, 65 (2), 54–66.
Weiss, Allen M. and Erin Anderson (1992), Converting from independent to employee salesforces: the role of per-
ceived switching costs, Journal of Marketing Research, 29 (1), 101–115.
Woodall, Tony (2003), Conceptualising ‘value for the customer’: an attributional, structural and dispositional analysis, 
Academy of Marketing Science Review, 7 (9), 1–42.
Woodruff, Robert B. (1997), Customer value: the next source of competitive advantage, Journal of the Academy of 
Marketing Science, 25 (2), 139–153.
Zauberman, Gal (2003), The intertemporal dynamics of consumer lock-in, Journal of Consumer Research, 30 (3), 
405–419.
Zeithaml, Valarie A. (1988), Consumer perceptions of price, quality, and value: a means-end model and synthesis of 
evidence. Journal of Marketing, 52 (3), 2–22.
Zeithaml, Valarie A., Leonard L. Berry, and Anantharanthan Parasuraman (1996), The behavioral consequences of 
service quality, Journal of Marketing, 60 (2), 31–46.
Copyright of Schmalenbach Business Review (SBR) is the property of Fachverlag der Verlagsgruppe
Handelsblatt and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the
copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for
individual use.
